FM 31-20-5
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ii
FM 31-20-5
REFERENCESSOURCES USED
These are the sources quoted or paraphrased in thispublication.
Joint and Multiservice PublicationsJoint Publication 1-02. DODDictionary of Military and Associated Terms,15 April 1988.
Joint Pub 3-05.5. Joint Special Operations Targeting and MissionPlanning Pro-cedures (Final Draft), August 1990.
STANAG 2174. Military Routes and Route/Road Networks, 10September 1978.
Army PublicationsAR 381-10. U.S. Army Intelligence Activities, 1July 1984.
FM 3-18. Special NBC Reconnaissance (LB Team), 3 June 1992.
FM 5-34. Engineer Field Data, 14 September 1987.
FM 5-103. Survivability, 10 June 1985.
FM 7-93. Long-Range Surveillance Unit Operations, 9 June1987.
FM 21-76. Survival, 5 June 1992.
FM 31-20. Doctrine for Special Forces Operations, 20 April1990.
FM 31-26. (SECRET/NOFORN/WNINTEL) Special Forces AdvancedOpera-tions Techniques (U) (To Be Published).
FM 31-71. Northern Operations, 21 June 1971.
FM 33-1. Psychological Operations, 31 July 1987.
FM 34-36. Special Operations Forces Intelligence and ElectronicWarfare Op-erations, 1 July 1990.
FM 90-3. Desert Operations, 19 August 1977.
FM 90-5. Jungle Operations, 16 August 1982.
FM 90-6. Mountain Operations, 30 June 1980.
FM 90-10 (HTF). Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT)(How toFight), 15 August 1979.
References-1
FM 31-20-5
FM 100-25. Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces, October1990.
FM 101-5. Operations, 5 May 1986.
FM 101-5-1. Operational Terms and Symbols, 21 October 1985.
STP 31-18C34-SM-TG. Soldier’s Manual and Trainer’s Guide for MOS18C,Skill Levels 3 and 4, 5 October 1990.
STP 31-18F4-SM-TG. Soldier’s Manual and Trainer’s Guide for MOS18F, SkillLevel 4, 10 June 1991.
TC 31-19. Special Forces Military Free-Fall Operations, 9September 1988.
TC 31-24. Special Forces Air Operations, 9 September 1988.
TC 31-25. Special Forces Waterborne Operations, 3 October1988.
TC 31-29. Special Forces Operational Techniques, 9 September1988.
TC 57-1. The Jumpmaster, 28 September 1979.
DOCUMENTS NEEDED
These documents must be available to the intended users of thispublication.
DA Form 5517-R. Standard Range Cards (LRA), February 1986.
READINGS RECOMMENDED
These readings contain relevant supplemental information.
FM 25-101. Battle Focused Training, 30 September 1990.
FM 34-60A. Counterintelligence Operations(SECRET/NOFORN/WNINTEL),6 June 1989.
FM 41-10. Civil Affairs Operations, 11 January 1993.
Department of Army Information Security Program, 25 February1988.
References-2
FM 31-20-5
PREFACESpecial reconnaissance (SR) is defined as reconnaissanceand surveillance ac-tions conducted by Special Forces (SF) toobtain or verify, by visual observa-tion or other collectionmethods, information concerning the capabilities,intentions, andactivities of an actual or potential enemy or to secure datacon-cerning the meteorologic, hydrographic, geographic, ordemographic charac-teristics of a particular area. It includestarget acquisition, area assessment, andpoststrikereconnaissance.
Field manual (FM) 31-20-5 provides the doctrinal basis for theconduct of SRmissions across the operational continuum. It is acontinuation of the doctrinaleducation process that begins withJoint Publication 3-05.5 and FMs 100-25and 31-20. This manualprovides information and guidance to SF commanders,staffs, andoperational personnel at battalion and lower echelons(SpecialForces operational detachments [SFODs] C, B, and A) intheir conduct of SR.It is a general guide and does not eliminatethe requirement for well-written,practiced, and mission-essentialtask list (METL)-driven standing operatingprocedures (SOPs).
It is designed to expand on and be supported by FM 31-20-1,Special Forces Tac-tics, Techniques, and Procedures (to bepublished). It was written under the as-sumption that the userunderstands these basic fundamentals. However, itexpands on thisbasic information by providing a number of historical examplestohighlight key points throughout the text as well as advancedtactics, tech-niques, procedures, and references to support futureSF operations. Users of thisFM should adapt its contents to meetthe situation and knowledge and skill levelsof the SFOD to beemployed through the mission, enemy, terrain, troops, andtimeavailable (METT-T) analysis system.
The chapters provide general SR mission procedures andinformation. This in-formation is ordered chronologically fromreceipt of the unit mission letterthrough postmission activities.Figure P-1 shows the applicability of each chapterto the differingunit levels. Examples of specific SR techniques and proceduresareprovided in the appendixes. The order of the appendixes follows theorderthey appear in the text. This organization permits the user ofthis FM to reviewthe basics of SR mission performance frombeginning to end without becomingembroiled in a mass of detail withwhich the user may be thoroughly familiar.For those users onlyinterested in the details of specific techniques, the appen-dixesprovide reference material keyed to the generic activities in thetext.
Commanders and trainers should use this and other relatedmanuals in conjunc-tion with command guidance, the Army Trainingand Evaluation Program
iv
FM 31-20-5
(ARTEP), and the Mission Training Program to plan and conductmission-specific training. Planning SR-related training prior tobeing employed with aspecific SR mission is the key to assuringsuccess.
The provisions of this publication are the subject of theinternational agreementslisted in the references in the back ofthis book. There are numerous acronyms,abbreviations, and termsfound within this manual. Users should refer to theGlossary sectionat the back of the manual for their meanings or definitions.
The proponent of this publication is the United States Army JohnF. Kennedy Spe-cial Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS), FortBragg, NC. Reviewers andusers of this manual should submit commentsand recommended changes on DAForm 2028 to Commander, USAJFKSWCS,ATTN: AOJK-DT-DM, Fort Bragg,NC 28307-5000.
Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine gender is used,both men andwomen are included.
v
FM 31-20-5
Index-1
FM 31-20-5
Index-2
FM 31-20-5
Index-3
FM 31-20-5
Index-4
FM 31-20-5
Index-5
FM 31-20-5
Index-6
FM 31-20-5
Index-7
FM 31-20-5
Index-8
FM 31-20-5
GLOSSARYPART I- ACRONYMS
AA
ADA
AO
AOB
AOE
AOR
APC
ARSOTF
ARTEP
ASA
ASOT
ASP
AST
ATLS
BD
BDU
BLS
BOB
BOS
BRIDGEREP
C2
C3I
CA
area assessment
air defense artillery
area of operations
advanced operational base
area of effect
area of responsibility
armored personnel carrier
Army special operations task force
Army Training and Evaluation Program
American Standard Association
advanced special operations training
ammunition supply point
area specialty team
advanced trauma life support
battle drill
battle-dress uniform
beach landing site
back of beach
battlefield operating systems
bridge report
command and control
command, control, communications, and intelligence
civil affairs
Glossary-1
FM 31-20-5
CARVER
CAS
CCTV
CD
CI
CINC
COA
COIN
CONOPS
CONPLAN
CONUS
CP
CSM
CSS
CT
DA
DCSINT
DELTREP
DF
DOD
DODIC
DP
DTG
DZ
E&E
ECCM
ECM
EFCS
EMR
EOD
FA
FCB
criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability,effect, recognizability
close air support
closed-circuit television
counterdrug
counterintelligence
commander in chief
course of action
counterinsurgency
concept of operations
concept plan
continental United States
command post
command sergeant major
combat service support
counterterrorism
direct action, Department of the Army
Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence
river/estuary report
direction finding
Department of Defense
Department of Defense Identification Code
datum point
date-time group
drop zone
evasion and escape
electronic counter-countermeasures
electronic countermeasures
electronic filmless camera system
electro-magnetic radiation
explosive ordnance disposal
feasibility assessment
forward control base
Glossary-2
FM 31-20-5
FID
FM
FOB
FSOP
GP
HAHO
See AlsoMissouri Lakes Have Something for EveryoneWhat's a heat dome? Here's why so much of the US is broiling this weekMissouri State Musical Theatre Cub Paper Bag - 8 X 4 1/2 X 10 1/4 By Jamesdsharp - Artistshot7 unusual campgrounds in Missouri and IllinoisHALO
HE
HEAT
HF
HLZ
HN
HNS
HUMINT
IAA
IAD
ICE
IDAD
IEW
IFV
IMINT
INTSUM
IPB
IR
ISB
ISOFAC
IV
JFC
JFSOCC
JIC
JRTC
JSCP
foreign internal defense
field manual
forward operational base
field standing operating procedure
general purpose
high altitude high opening
high altitude low opening
high explosive
high explosive anti-tank
high frequency
helicopter landing zone
host nation
host nation support
human intelligence
initial area assessment
immediate action drill
individual chemical equipment
internal defense and development
intelligence and electronic warfare
infantry fighting vehicle
imagery intelligence
intelligence summary
intelligence preparation of the battlefield
information requirements
intermediate staging base
isolation facility
intravenous
joint force commander
joint force special operations component commander
joint information center
Joint Readiness Training Center
joint strategic capabilities plan
Glossary-3
FM 31-20-5
MFF
MHW
JSOA
JSOACC
JSOTF
JTCB
KIA
LBE
LNO
LOC
LRRP
LRSU
LTD
LZ
METL
METT-T
MI
MICON
MLW
MOPP
MOS
MPA
MPU
MRE
MSC
MSD
MSP
MSS
MSU
MTOE
MTP
joint special operations area
joint force special operations air component commander
joint special operations task force
joint targeting coordination board
killed in action
load-bearing equipment
liaison office
lines of communication
long-range reconnaissance patrol
long-range surveillance unit
laser target designation
landing zone
mission-essential task list
mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available
military free-fall
mean high water
military intelligence
mission concept
military intelligence detachment
mean low water
mission-oriented protective posture
military occupational specialty
mission planning agent
message pickup
meal, ready-to-eat
major subordinate command
minimum safe distance
mission support package
mission support site
major subordinate unit
modification table of organization and equipment
mission tasking package
MID
Glossary-4
FM 31-20-5
NVD
MTT
NAI
NATO
NBC
NCA
NCO
NM
NRT
NVG
O&I
OB
Oco*kA
OP
OPCEN
OPLAN
OPSEC
ORP
PAA
PCP
PDM
PIR
POC
POE
POI
POL
PSYOP
PW
PWP
QRF
R&S
mobile training team
named area of interest
North American Treaty Organization
nuclear, biological, and chemical
National Command Authorities
noncommissioned officer
nautical miles
near-real-time
night vision device
night vision goggles
operations and intelligence
order of battle
observation and fields of fire, cover and concealment,obstacles, key terrain,and avenues of approach
observation post
operations center
operation plan
operations security
objective rally point
principal area assessment
peacetime campaign plans
pursuit deterrent mines
priority intelligence requirements
point of contact
plan of execution
point of impact
petroleum, oils, and lubricants
psychological operations
prisoner of war
plasticized white phosphorous
quick reaction force
reconnaissance and surveillance
Glossary-5
FM 31-20-5
RFI
RII
ROE
ROUTEREP
RP
RPG
RSP
S1
S2
S3
S4
SA
SALUTE
SAS
SATCOM
SCIF
SDC
SF
SFOB
SFOD
SIGCEN
SIGINT
SI0
SIR
SJA
SL
SLR
SO
SOC
SOCCE
SOCOORD
SOCRATES
request for information
request for intelligence information
rules of engagement
routes and roads report
rally point
rocket propelled grenade
render-safe procedures
personnel officer
intelligence officer
operations officer
logistics officer
security assistance
size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment
Special Air Service
satellite communications
sensitive compartmented information facility
specific data collection
Special Forces
Special Forces operational base
Special Forces operational detachment
signal center
signals intelligence
senior intelligence officer
specific information requirements
staff judge advocate
static-line
single-lens reflex
special operations
special operations command
special operations command and control element
special operations coordination element
Special Operations Command Research Analysis and ThreatEvaluation System
Glossary-6
FM 31-20-5
SODARS
SOF
SOMPF
SOP
SOT A
SOTIC
SPETSNAZ
SPOTREP
SPTCEN
SR
SUPCEN
SURFREP
SWO
TACBEREP
TACCTA
TA
TAI
TASOSC
TE
TGTRECONREP
TOC
UAV
USAJFKSWCS
USASOC
USCINCSOC
USMC
USSOCOM
UW
WIA
WLTS
Special Operations Debriefing and Retrieval System
special operations forces
special operations mission planning folder
standing operating procedure
support operation team A
Special Operations Target Interdiction Course
Soviet Special Purpose Forces
report of enemy sighting
support center
special reconnaissance
support center
surf report
staff weather officer
tactical beach report
tactical commander’s terrain analysis
target analysis
target area of interest
theater Army special operations support command
technical evaluation
target reconnaissance report
target intelligence package
tactical operations center
unmanned-aerial vehicle
United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center andSchool
United States Army Special Operations Command
United States Commander in Chief, Special Operations Command
United States Marine Corps
United States Special Operations Command
unconventional warfare
wounded in action
water line at the time of sounding
white phosphorousWP
Glossary-7
FM 31-20-5
PART II - DEFINTIONS
area assessment
asset (intelligence)
compartmentation
deconflict
direct action
direct action operations
evasion and escape
evasion and escape net
executive order
exfiltration
foreign intelligence
In unconventional warfare, the collection of specificinformation prescribed bythe commander to commence immediatelyafter infiltration. It is a continuousoperation, and it confirms,corrects, refutes, or adds to intelligence acquired fromareastudies and other sources prior to infiltration.
(DOD, IADB) Any resource-person, group, relationship,instrument, installa-tion, or supply—at the disposition of anintelligence organization for use in anoperational or support role.Often used with a qualifying term such as agent assetor propagandaasset. (JCS Pub 1-02)
(DOD) 1. Establishment and management of an intelligenceorganization so thatinformation about the personnel, organization,or activities of one component ismade available to any othercomponent only to the extent required for the perfor-mance ofassigned duties. (JCS Pub 1-02) 2. In unconventional warfare, thedivi-sion of an organization or activity into functional segmentsor cells to restrictcommunication between them and preventknowledge of the identity or activitiesof other segments except ona need-to-know basis. 3. Restricting the use of spe-cificcryptovariables to specific users for the purpose of limitingaccess to theinformation protected by these cryptovariables andlimiting the adverse impactof a compromise of these variables. (AR310-25)
To reconcile or resolve a conflict in interests as intargeting.
In special operations, a specified act involving operations ofan overt, clandes-tine, or low visibility nature conductedprimarily by special operations forces inhostile or denied areas.(JCS Pub 1-02)
Short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actionsby special opera-tions forces to seize, destroy, or inflict damageon a specified target; or to de-stroy, capture, or recoverdesignated personnel or material. In the conduct oftheseoperations, special operations forces may employ raid, ambush, ordirectassault tactics; emplace mines and other munitions; conductstandoff attacks byfire from air, ground, or maritime platforms;provide terminal guidance for preci-sion guided munitions; andconduct independent sabotage. (USCINCSOC)
(DOD, I, NATO, IADB) The procedures and operations wherebymilitary per-sonnel and other selected individuals are enabled toemerge from an enemy-heldor hostile area to areas under friendlycontrol. (JCS Pub 1-02)
(DOD, IADB) The organization within enemy-held or hostile areasthat operatesto receive, move, and exfiltrate military personnel orselected individuals tofriendly control. (JCS Pub 1-02)
Order issued by the President by virtue of the authority vestedin him by theConstitution or by an act of Congress. It has theforce of law. (AR 310-25)
(DOD) The removal of personnel or units from areas under enemycontrol.(JCS Pub 1-02)
Information relating to the capabilities, intentions, andactivities of foreign pow-ers, organizations, or persons, but notincluding counterintelligence, except forinformation oninternational terrorist activities. (DOD Directive 5240.1)
Glossary-8
FM 31-20-5
.
infiltration
intelligence reporting
joint doctrine
joint operations
joint special operations area
low intensity conflict
low visibility operations
observation post (OP)
observation site
operational command
(DOD, NATO, IADB) 1. The movement through or into an area orterritory occu-pied by either friendly or enemy troops ororganizations. The movement is madeeither by small groups or byindividuals at extended or irregular intervals. Whenused inconnection with the enemy, it infers that contact is avoided. 2. Inintelli-gence usage, placing an agent or other person in a targetarea in hostile territory.Usually involves crossing a frontier orother guarded line. Methods of infiltrationare black (clandestine),grey (through legal crossing point but under false docu-mentation),white (legal). 3. A technique and process in which a force movesasindividuals or small groups over, through, or around enemypositions withoutdetection. (JCS Pub 1-02)
(DOD, IADB) The preparation and conveyance of information by anymeans.More commonly, the term is restricted to reports as they areprepared by thecollector and as they are transmitted by him to hisheadquarters and by thiscomponent of the intelligence structure toone or more intelligence-producingcomponents. Thus, even in thislimited sense, reporting embraces both collectionand dissemination.The term is applied to normal and specialist intelligencereports.(JCS Pub 1-02)
(DOD) Fundamental principles that guide the employment of forcesof two ormore Services of the same nation in coordinated actiontoward a common objec-tive. It is ratified by all four Services andmay be promulgated by the Joint Chiefsof Staff. (JCS Pub 1-02)
Operations carried on by two or more of the Armed Forces of theUnited States(Army, Navy, Air Force). (AR 310-25)
That area of land, sea, and airspace assigned to a joint specialoperations com-mand to conduct SO activities.
(DOD) A limited politico-military struggle to achieve political,social, economic,or psychological objectives. It is oftenprotracted and ranges from diplomatic,economic, and psychosocialpressures through terrorism and insurgency. Lowintensity conflictis generally confined to a geographic area and isoftencharacterized by constraints on the weaponry, tactics, and thelevel of violenceAlso called LIC. (JCS Pub 1-02)
(DOD) Sensitive operations wherein the political/militaryrestrictions inherent incovert and clandestine operations areeither not necessary or not feasible; actionsare taken as requiredto limit exposure of those involved and/or their activities.(JCSPub 1-02)An OP is a valuable part of most defensive postures. OPsare normally temporaryor one-time-use positions occupied overnight.They are used to ensure earlywarning for the defensiveperimeter.
An observation site is a preplanned structure that is designedto be occupied for ex-tended periods. Construction techniquesshould be practiced in areas where theconditions and/or terrain aresimilar to those found in the target area. The size of thesite mustbe large enough to accommodate both the observers and theirequipment.
(DOD, IADB) Those functions of command involving the compositionof subor-dinate forces, the assignment of tasks, the designation ofobjectives, and the au-thoritative direction necessary toaccomplish the mission. Operational commandshould be exercised bythe use of the assigned normal organizational unitsthrough theirresponsible commanders or through the commanders of subordi-
Glossary-9
FM 31-20-5
nate forces established by the commander exercising operationalcommand. Itdoes not include such matters as administration,discipline, internal organization,and unit training, except when asubordinate commander requests assistance.(JCS Pub 1-02) The termis synonymous with “operational control” and isuniquely applied tothe operational control exercised by the commanders ofunified andspecified commands over assigned forces in accordance with theNa-tional Security Act of 1947, as amended and revised (10 UnitedStates Code124). (JCS Pub 1-02)
overt operation (DOD, IADB) The collection of intelligenceopenly, without concealment.(JCS Pub 1-02)
proactive Acting in anticipation of future problems orneeds.
special operations Actions conducted by specially organized,trained and equipped military andparamilitary forces to achievemilitary, political, economic, or psychological ob-jectives bynonconventional military means in hostile, denied, or politicallysen-sitive areas. They are conducted in peace, conflict, and war,independently or incoordination with operations of conventionalforces. Politico-military considera-tions frequently shape specialoperations, requiring clandestine, covert, or lowvisibilitytechniques, and oversight at the national level. Special operationsdifferfrom conventional operations in degree of risk, operationaltechniques, mode ofemployment, independence from friendly support,and dependence on detailedoperational intelligence and indigenousassets. (USCINCSOC)
special reconnaissance SR operations arc reconnaissance andsurveillance actions conducted by specialoperations forces toobtain or verify, by visual observation or other collectionmethods,information concerning the capabilities, intentions, and activitiesof anactual or potential enemy or to secure data concerning themeteorological, hydro-graphic, or geographic characteristics of aparticular area. It includes target ac-quisition, area assessment,and poststrike reconnaissance. (USCINCSOC)
strategic intelligence (DOD) Intelligence that is required forthe formation of policy and military plansat national andinternational levels. Strategic intelligence and tacticalintelligencediffer primarily in level of application but may alsovary in terms of scope anddetail. (JCS Pub 1-02)
Glossary-10
FM 31-20-5
SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCETACTICS, TECHNIQUES,AND PROCEDURESFORSPECIAL FORCES
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION:Distribution authorized to U.S.Government agencies only to protect technical oroperationalinformation from automatic dissemination under theInternationalExchange Program or by other means. This determinationwas made on 7 March 1990.Other requests for this document will bereferred to Commander, U.S. Army John F.Kennedy Special WarfareCenter and School, ATTN: AOJK-DT-DM, Fort Bragg, NC28307-5000
DESTRUCTION NOTICE:Destroy by any method that will preventdisclosure of contents or reconstruction ofthe document.
Headquarters, Department of the Army
i
FM 31-20-5
CHAPTER
POSTMISSIONACTIVITIESInformation gathering is the goal of all SRoperations. Gathering additionalinformation accomplishes two goals.First, the information prevents the SFODfrom having to go back intothe same area to perform another reconnaissanceto gain moreinformation. Second, if needed, a quick reaction force (QRF)orother reinforcements can be given guidance for the best routethrough the areato adjacent SFODs or units. After completing SRmission tasks, the SFODquickly exfiltrates to an isolation facility(ISOFAC) or other secure area fordebriefing, preparation ofafter-action and lessons learned reports, reconstitu-tion,recovery, stand down, or regeneration as required. SF units haveSOPsfor postmission SFOD debriefing to ensure all neededinformation is obtained.Debriefings must be timely and address PIR,IR, other mission-specific re-quirements, and other information.Command emphasis is essential to the suc-cess of these postmissionactivities.
MISSION DEBRIEFING
Immediately after the SFOD’s arrival at the ISOFAC, the staff ofthe recoveringoperational base begins the debriefing process. Thepurpose of this quick andsystematic debriefing is to capture asmuch accurate information as is availablefrom the SFOD in theshortest time possible. For example, PIR may be mission-specificinformation on the operational capability of an enemy unit.However, ifthe SFOD noticed large movements of noncombatants duringcertain hours, re-porting this information may help to identifyenemy population control opera-tions being undertaken. This extrainformation could play a key role in the timingof futureinfiltrations. The returning SFOD is also questioned about mapcorrec-tions during all debriefing sessions. This key informationaids in both plannedand emergency exfiltrations or reinforcementoperations.
Debriefing StaffThe AOB and/or FOB debriefing staff conductsdebriefings. Appendix D con-tains information on debriefingformats. Priority in debriefing the SFOD goes tothe SIO and hisstaff. Debriefings are tape recorded and or videotaped, and theSIOmaintains these tapes on file for long-term use. The debriefingstaff is madeup of the following:
OPCEN director or base deputy commander (committeechairperson).OPCEN operations officer (S3).SIO (S2).
4-1
FM 31-20-5
AST for the recovered SFOD.SPTCEN personnel officer (S1).SPTCENlogistics officer (S4).CA staff officer.PSYOP staff officer.Signalcenter (SIGCEN) director or senior signal officer.Medicaloperations officer.Judge advocate.Staff weather officer(SWO).Chaplain.Unit historian.Others as directed by the OPCENdirector.
ProceduresAs soon as the SFOD is recovered, and before itsmembers are allowed to attendto personal hygiene and other personalmatters, members undergo a rapid de-briefing as a group. Thedebriefing procedures described below address the basicsteps to befollowed as part of the debriefing process.
Collective Intelligence Debriefing. The intelligence staffconducts this debriefing,but other staff elements may also bepresent. The purpose of this debriefing is toanswer PIR and/or SIR,elicit indications, and provide warning.
Format. This debriefing is quick and to the point. The formatand line of question-ing varies from mission to mission but isdetermined by the OPCEN director inaccordance with the unit SOP.See FMs 34-36 and 31-20 for examples of thetypes of information forwhich the SFOD can be queried. For use of specificdebriefing guidesfrom the United States Special Operations Command’s(USSOCOM’s)concept of operations (CONOPS), and Special Operations De-briefingand Retrieval System (SODARS), refer to USSOCOM’s SOCRATES.TheBattalion S2 has access to this system. Appendix D has an exampleof adebriefing guide. The intelligence staff immediate y exploitstime-sensitiveinformation critical to decision making by thecommander or higher headquar-ters. For example, a priority maybethe location of insurgent safe houses that aretargets for DAteams.
Technique. Normally, the principal debriefer uses a techniqueknown as “map-tracking.” The primary debriefing aid used is a mapof the SFOD’s AO. The de-briefer starts at the point ofinfiltration or embarkation and follows the routetravelled by theunit. He proctors the flow of information to ensure allevents,sightings, and activities conducted to the point ofexfiltration or debarkation arecovered. After getting the initialinformation, the debriefer then segments returnroute information.He asks specific questions with emphasis on operating sys-tems(intelligence, communications, engineering, weaponry, and medicalas-pects) that affected the SFOD’s mission. Throughout thedebriefing, the debriefermaintains a relaxed and nonhostileatmosphere in which the unit recounts its ac-tivities. A qualfieddebriefer such as a member of the battalion counterintelli-gence(CI) team, an interrogator, or an order of battle technicianconducts the
4-2
FM 31-20-5
debriefing. If such a person is not available, a detached butknowledgeable proc-tor and prompter collect and record theinformation concerning the SFOD’s ob-servations during itsmission.
Review of SFOD Documents and Other Materiel. After thecollective intelligence de-briefing, the intelligence staff gathersall maps, notebooks, papers, exposed film,video tapes, photographs,recovered equipment, and other materiel. It then re-leases the SFODto attend to personal hygiene, rest, and recuperate. Ifnecessary,all rucksacks, map cases, and uniform pockets areinventoried to ensure all itemsof intelligence interest arecollected. The intelligence staff thoroughly reviews allof thecollected items for data and formulates more detailed questions forthenext stage of debriefing.
Individual Debriefing. As soon as the intelligence staff isready, and in any case notlater than three hours after the SFOD hasrecovered to the operational base, theintelligence staff calls SFODmembers in individually for detailed debriefing. Atthis stage indebriefing, the intelligence staff focuses first on thecommander’sPIR and SIR and then on IR. The intelligence staff alsocollects information onthe adequacy of preinfiltration intelligencesupport. As an individual is releasedby the intelligence staff,other staff elements may conduct similar individual de-briefings.However, no other staff element should talk with an SFODmemberuntil the intelligence staff has had its turn.
General Collective Debriefing and After-Action Review. Afterindividual debriefings,and not later than 6 hours after the SFODhas recovered to the operational base,the base debriefing staffassembles the SFOD and the staff as a group for a generalcollectivedebriefing and after-action review. The base commander may alsobepresent. At this debriefing, the SFOD leader gives a quicksummary of the opera-tion, focusing on the SFOD’s stated andimplied missions. He also briefs unantici-pated SFOD’s or members’activities (for example, to exploit a high-value sourceofinformation). After the SFOD leader gives his summary, each staffsection, inturn, questions the SFOD members and augmenters. At theconclusion of thisstage of the debriefing, the commander or OPCENdirector provides any necessaryfurther guidance. The SFOD is thenreleased to prepare its after-action review andreport of lessonslearned. Odinarily, this debriefing includes—
Name, rank, and position of each SFOD member.Mission.Time,location, and insertion and extraction methods.Routes.Terrain(vegetation, height of canopy if in forest, trails, water sourcesanddirection of flow, LZs and BLZs), local population, includingdistance anddirection to the nearest terrain feature, and naturaland man-made obstaclesto movement in the area.SFOD’s uniforms andequipment.Hostile forces (strength, activity, location, uniform,time, equipment, weap-ons, and morale).Results of hostile contact(friendly and enemy killed in action [KIA] andwounded in action[WIA], disposition of KIA, PWs, descriptions and se-rial numbers ofcaptured weapons, and descriptions of captured docu-ments andequipment).
4-3
FM 31-20-5
Weapons, demolitions, and ammunition used and results.Mapcorrections.Communications equipment used and results.Friendlycontacts, including descriptions, locations, circ*mstances, andresults.Miscellaneous information such as incorporation ofsurveillance plan, secu-rity procedures, surveillance techniquesused, and surveillance site type,construction, andoccupation.Condition of the SFOD, including time needed to preparefor the next mission.Conclusions and recommendations.
Electronic Information Retrieval. Upon completion of adebriefing, the battalion S2places the information into the mostappropriate format in accordance withUSSOCOM’s CONOPS and SODARS toensure it can be retrieved andcross-referenced within the chain ofcommand and the SOCRATES. Thebattalion S2 has access to theseformats and systems. He forwards debriefingreports via secure STUIII data modem or by mail or courier on 5.25-inch floppydisksthrough operational channels to the Deputy Chief of Staff forIntelligence(DCSINT), United States Army Special Operations Command(USASOC), forfinal review and electronic submission via SOCRATES toUSSOCOM.
Security Manager Duties. Once a debriefing is completed, theunit securitymanager reviews all resulting reports to ensure theyare properly classified. Hefurther reviews each report for anyunclassified but sensitive information. Heensures that each reportis marked with the appropriate classification markings.
FOLLOW-ON MISSIONS
As stated in FM 31-20, follow-on missions may be conducted;however, suchmissions must be performed by exception and not byrule. SFODs may performthese missions under the followingconditions:
The follow-on mission becomes a new, separate mission.The newmission allows for additional planning time.The new mission doesnet compromise the main mission.The follow-on mission does not gobeyond the SFOD’s capability or itstask organization.The SFOD Atrained for the mission and has the mission-specific equipment.TheSFOD going into isolation understands that this is a “be preparedto”follow-on mission at the time the mission letter and/or briefingis issued.
WRITTEN REPORTS
After the debriefing, the SFOD leader, assisted by other membersof the SFODand attachments, prepares several written reports. Theunit historian prepares theunit’s historical report.
4-4
FM 31-20-5
After-Action ReportThe after-action report states the who, what,when, why, where, and how of theoperation. It is a permanent recordof the SFOD’s major activities from isolationto debriefing. Assuch, it is an extremely important template on which past mis-sionsmay be compared and future missions planned. The battalion S3 willsub-mit the SFOD’s after-action report through command channels tothe groupcommander not later than 48 hours after the SFOD A hasbeen debriefed. Theintelligence and operations officers at eachechelon maintain copies of SFOD’safter-action report. The unithistorian reviews this report and prepares a drafthistoricalreport.
Report of Lessons LearnedShortly after completing theafter-action report, or simultaneously with its sub-mission, theSFOD leader submits a report of lessons learned. This report istheSFOD leader’s reflection on the operation and his recommendationfor the fu-ture. This report organizes lessons learned according tothe seven BOS (seeChapter 1). It addresses what worked and did notwork on the operation, why itdid or did not work, and what changesare needed in existing tactics, techniques,and procedures in theunit.
Unit Historical ReportThe unit historian reviews the report oflessons learned and then finalizes thedraft unit historical reportand submits it for the commander’s approval. He is-sues theofficial historical report of the operation, in classified andunclassifiedversions as appropriate, within 90 days after thecompletion of the operation.
Technical Intelligence ReportSFODs may encounter first seen,odd, or modified U.S. or foreign equipment.These items should bereported using a technical intelligence report (shown inAppendixD). New, modified, or enhanced equipment is not normallyconsideredclassified, but enemy-modified U.S. equipment is. Forexample, a discovery of aU.S. projectile modified by the enemy toaccept non-U.S. fuzes would be classi-fied. Common sense and AR380-5 will dictate classification.
4-5
FM 31-20-5
CHAPTER
EMPLOYMENTThere are no “generic” SR missions on today’sbattlefields or during peace.Each mission has challenges that mustbe overcome through comprehensiveplanning. The goal of the plannersmust be to identify those tasks that must beaccomplished to executethe OPLAN. Some of the tasks that will support theOPLAN during theconduct of SR are area assessment, target acquisition,hy-drographic reconnaissance, poststrike reconnaissance, technicalevaluation,NBC reconnaissance, specific data collection, and otherrelated tasks.
AREA ASSESSMENTS
An AA is defined and discussed in FM 31-20 as part of thesituationdevelopment process. AAs are not independent SR missions.The AA is oftenassociated with infiltration, but in fact, is acontinuous process. As shown inFigure 3-1 (page 3-3), the AA startsat infiltration and ends after exfiltration. AAis linked with theIPB process and is directly related to on-going and/orfutureoperations. The AA serves as the basis for the commander’sestimate of thesituation in the area of operations (AO). He uses itto modify plans made duringisolation. For this reason, theinformation must be updated as the missionpermits. The AA processcan be divided into two distinct stages—initial andprincipal areaassessments.
Initial Area AssessmentAn initial area assessment (IAA) is doneby the SFOD immediately upon infiltra-tion. An example ofinformation reported in the IAA is unexpected groundconditions thatwill prevent the SFOD from arriving at the target during theplannedtime. The IAA is reported to the rear in a timely manner. It isroutinelyincluded in the initial entry report as a one-line entryin the other informationsection. The exact time requirement forthese reports must be part of theOPLAN. The IAA ends after it hasbeen transmitted and received through thechain of command. Theprincipal area assessment (PAA) then begins.
Principal Area AssessmentThe primary goal of the PAA is tocontinually “confirm, correct, refute, or add topreviousintelligence gained before infiltration.” The PAA should expandtheIAA to include all aspects of the operational area. Some of theaspects are thethreat, resistance movements, civil government,populace, targets, weather, ter-rain, and the logisticalcapabilities of the area.
3-1
FM 31-20-5
TARGET ACQUISITION
SF conducts target acquisition for two reasons. The primary goalis to “fix” thetarget. An example of fixing the target is to verifythe emplacement of mobileweapons systems at prepared launch sites(Figure 3-2). The second goal is to update information on known orsuspected targets. To gain this information, PIRand IR must addressthe SIR of the follow-on DA element or of persnnel de-ployingweapons systems against the target. During target acquisition,theSFODs continue with the AA process and report changes that couldhinder thefollowing operations. Some of the planning considerationsare—
The rules of engagement.Coordinated linkup operations with thefollow-on forces.Coordinated no-fire and restrictive-fire zone forweapons systems operators.Political considerations.Effect andreaction of the local populace.
HYDROGRAPHIC RECONNAISSANCE
Hydrographlc reconnaissance is the reconnaissance ofoperationally or strategi-cally significant bodies of water andmarginal land areas. It is conducted to deter-mine water depths,beach gradients, the nature of the bottom, location ofobstacles andbarriers, speed of currents, thickness of ice, defensivepreparations,and other military and nonmilitary characteristics ofa target. SFODs performhydrographic reconnaissance of point,diffuse, and linear targets that lie aboveand below the water line.Hydrographic reconnaissance missions conducted bySF are describedbelow. For a detailed discussion of SF waterborne operations,see TC31-25.
Beach Surveys
A beach survey is the collection of data describing thecharacteristics of a specificbeach. Figure 3-3, page 3-4 is atypical beach profile. The survey is used to deter-mine if thebeach is suitable for military operations. A beach survey may becon-ducted openly or clandestinely using the beach survey format atAppendix D.SFODs normally conduct beach surveys to validatepreexisting data. Often, thesesurveys are in support of other SOF.SFODs may also prepare tactical beach re-ports (TACBEREPs) and surfreports (SURFREPs) using the message formats atAppendix D. Whenreconnoitering beaches, SFODs can perform basic beachre-connaissance as depicted in Figure 3-4 and as describedbelow.
Beach Characteristics. A beach is a strip of sand, pebbles, orother material ex-tending inland from the line of extreme low waterto the coastline. Its length isthe distance along the beach at thewater’s edge during high and low tides be-tween the ends of thebeach. The shape of a beach is classified as straight, con-cave, orconvex. The coastline is marked by the limit of normal wave actionandis classified as cliff, dune, or plain.
3-2
FM 31-20-5
3-3
FM 31-20-5
Beach width is the average distance from the low-waterline tothe coastline. Thedatum plane is used to determine the shorelineand the low-water line.
The foreshore is part of the shore or beach that lies betweenthe extreme low-water line and the upper limit of normal waves. Thecomposition of the foreshoremay be silt, mud, gravel, boulders,rock, coral, or any combination. The gradient(or percentage ofslope) of the foreshore is expressed as a ratio of water depthtohorizontal distance. See the TACBEREP message format at AppendixD.
The Backshore width is measured from the upper limit of normalwave actioninland to the extreme limit of storm wave action.Backshore gradient and com-position of the backshore are identifiedin the same manner as those of the fore-shore. Vegetation is oftenfound growing here since it is normally dry and actedupon only bystorm waves.
The hinterland is the area extending five miles inland. Itbegins at the coastline(the first line of permanentvegetation).Beach Survey Procedures. Beach survey procedures willvary according toMETT-T and the permissiveness of the environment.During the reconnaissance,each swimmer records obstacles, waveheight, surf conditions, and other perti-nent information. Time andazimuth are used to record distances and locations,which will beapproximate even under optimal water and light conditions.Theprocedures described below characterize a relatively simpletactical beach recon-naissance (see Figure 3-4, page 3-5).
3-4
FM 31-20-5
Two-man swim teams are dropped off by aircraft or watercraftparallel to thebeach and outside the surf zone. One man in eachteam carries a leadline for mea-suring depths. The other man in theteam is the recorder. There are normally twoswimmers for every 25meters of beach to be reconnoitered. The team leader andassistantteam leader are paired in the center of the formation and act as aguideand reference point for the other teams in the line.
Upon signal from the guide team, the swimmers move toward thebeach. Theguide team may use a compass to help in swimming apredetermined course toand from the beach, or it may guide on adesignated object on the beach.
Teams remain at 25-meter intervals and swim parallel to eachother as they slowlymove toward the beach. With a current in excessof 2 knots, the SFOD will tend todrift in the direction ofcurrent.
Just outside the surf zone, each team halts and examines thebeach and as far intothe backshore as can be seen.
When the leadline man in each team estimates the depth is 6.5meters (usuallythe depth at which recordings are first made), helowers his line.
3-5
FM 31-20-5
When the leadline touches the bottom, the leadline man notifieshis buddy (therecorder) who signals the guide team to stop. Therecorder records the depth onhis slate.
The guide team estimates the distance to the high watermark andsignals allteams to take a sounding.
From this point on, soundings are recorded every meter towardsthe target areauntil a 1.8-meter depth is reached and then at0.3-meter increments up to the wa-ter’s edge. Whenever a swim teamreaches a 5.5-, 3.6-, or 1.8-meter sounding, italso takes a bottomsample. On the seaward lane the process is reversed.
At the high waterline (or at the water’s edge if the team leaderhas determinedthat is the safe limit for the team), all teams shiftleft 12.5 meters with each teamrecording the beach gradient and anyother significant foreshore, backshore, orhinterland features inits area. A technique for measuring the beach gradientisillustrated in Figure 3-5. Each swim team also covers itsassigned sector of fire toprotect the team from surprise attackfrom its front or flanks.
When the shift left has been completed, all teams swim back outto sea, takingsoundings as before, following the guide pair. Oncethe mission is complete, theswim teams will then be extracted.Extraction may be at a prearranged time orafter a prearrangedsignal from the pickup craft.
Key Points. Several key points need to be kept in mind as theSFOD conducts atactical beach survey.
One team of swimmers should be designated beforehand to observethe surf fora SURFREP rather than take soundings during thereconnaissance.
3-6
FM 31-20-5
If the recconnaissance is to be accurate, the swim teams mustmaintain the properinterval and all pairs must follow the guidethroughout the reconnaissance. An-other technique to add accuracyis to have a third swimmer with a 25-meter lineaccompany the guidepair, he can swim ahead to where the next sounding shouldbe taken.This procedure can also help verify the guide’s initial distanceestimate.
When making a dive during a tactical survey, swimmers mustensure noise and/orlight discipline for security purposes. Swimmersshould be careful to avoiddetection from the beach. They shouldavoid allowing the sun to reflect off theface mask, holding theline or slate above water when sounding or recording,proceedinginto shallow water, or raising the body out of the water when closetothe beach.
During each beach survey, thorough photographic coverage isessential. See Ap-pendix C. The areas to be covered are—
Offshore to hinterland panoramas.Backshore and hinterlandpanoramas.Beach exits.Hinterlands.Miscellaneous.
From both the left and right flanks of the beach, standing atthe water’s edge, thephotographer takes overlapping panoramic viewsbeginning offshore and sweep-ing inshore. If light conditionspermit, a videocamera is used. The frames showthe approaches,reefs, waterlines, full length of the beach, full width of thebeach,and beach gradient.
From the scarp at the center of the beach, the photographertakes a panorama ofthe backshore and hinterland, ridges,escarpments, vegetation, and obstacles.
The photographer obtains medium views and close-ups emphasizinglocation,surrounding features, and trafficability. He takes viewsfrom the beach facing in-land and from the high ground inlandfacing seaward.
The frames of the hinterland show vegetation, soil and recktypes, trafficabilityindications such as wheel tracks and swampareas, obstacles, habitation, roads,and defenses or defendablepositions.
The photographer takes pictures that show conditions orobstacles that will helpidentify the material composition andtrafficability of the beach. He should takecomplete coverage(including close-ups) of any features encroaching on or limit-ingthe usefulness of the landing areas, such as hazards to approachand barriersto egress. He includes personal or familiar objects inphotographs to help the in-terpreter in determining measurements,All photographs are logged as describedin Appendix C.
Hydrographic SurveysA hydrographic survey is the collection andassessment of data about specificbodies of water and marginal landareas and their effects on operations. A hydro-graphic survey andbeach survey overlap in that they both involve the collectionofdata relative to the foreshore area. The survey may be conductedopenly or
3-7
FM 31-20-5
clandestinely. SFODs normally do hydrographic surveys to confirmor verify in-formation on a particular body of water and marginalland areas. The hydrographicsurvey report is written in messageformat, depending on mission requirements.The written report may beaccompanied by sketches (see Figure 3-6), overlays,photographs, andexposed film, bottom samples from the foreshore andnearshoreapproaches are also attached to amplify informationcontained in the report. Thesketch that accompanies the report isto scale. It shows the shoreline; the 1-, 2-,and 3-fathom curves;the foreshore; obstacles cultural features; beach flanks; andbeachinterruptions as seen from above. The sketch depicts the nearshoreand fore-shore gradients by showing three cross-sections taken atthe beach center and inthe middle of the left and right sections ofthe beach. The vertical scale of thecress-sections is usuallylarger than the horizontal scale of the cross-sections.Allsoundings by the survey party are shown on the sketch. Theintelligence NCO,under the supervision of the SFOD technician,prepares the hydrographic surveyreport in accordance with theformat at Appendix D. In the course of doing a hy-drographicsurvey, the survey team may prepare SURFREPs andriver/estuaryreports (DELTREPs).
Ports ReconnaissanceA port is a town or city having a harbor forships taking on or discharging cargo.Because of the high density ofman-made structures and their relevance to SO,the SR of portscombines the techniques of hydrographic survey; AA;technicalevaluation and CARVER analysis; and mapping, sketching andphotographing(Appendix C). SFODs can conduct port reconnaissanceovertly or clandestinely.The emphasis in port reconnaissance is theidentification, location, and assess-ment of criticalinfrastructure and the accessibility and vulnerability of thatinfra-structure. At a minimum, port surveys address—
Access routes, capacities, and conditions of cargo, refueling,and repairberths and other facilities.Bulk energy production,storage, transmission, and distribution (petroleum,oils, andlubricants [POL], electric power).Telecommunications (radio,television, telephone).Transportation, LOC, and associatedfacilities (railroads, highways, bridges,and airfields).Bulk watersupply.Bulk storage of dry goods.Health services.Governmentadministration and services.Fire and security services.Localmilitary forces.
Wateway ReconnaissanceWaterways include trafficable estuaries,rivers, canals, locks, and other associ-ated structures such asbridges and dams. SFODs perform waterway surveys inmuch the sameway as they do coastal hydrographic surveys. The basicmessageformat used is the DELTREP (Appendix D). In inland surveysof integratedtransportation, the SFOD maps out the transportationnetwork infrastructure, fo-cusing on critical nodes and chokepoints within this network. The basic messageformats used in thereconnaissance of land routes are the routes and roadsreport(ROUTEREP) and bridge report (BRIDGEREP).
3-8
FM 31-20-5
3-9
FM 31-20-5
METEOROLOGICAL RECONNAISSANCE
Sudden changes in weather conditions often play a major role inthe execution ordevelopment of military plans. Meteorology for aspecific area plays a major rolein determining missionrequirements. The two areas most affected by the weatheraretransportation and supply activities. Commanders need to have aclear andcurrent understanding of all aspects of the JSOA. SF unitsconducting meteoro-logical reconnaissance can provide informationthat will help commanders deter-mine where they can maneuver theirunits to best exploit their strengths againstthe threat’sweaknesses. Learning the true amount of illumination passingthroughdense foliage or the fordability of a rain swollen river or thetrafficabilityof a region all fall under this area of SR. Asmentioned before, SFODs shouldcross reference information availablefrom other national assets such as satellitesor sources currentlyin the JSOA.
GEOGRAPHIC RECONNAISSANCE
Like meteorological reconnaissance, geographic reconnaissancemay be requiredto support developing or existing plans. Specificquestions about planned routescan help commanders determine whatvehicle or unit will best be able to executethe mission athand.
POSTSTRIKE RECONNAISSANCE
Poststrike reconnaissance is the visual, photographic, and/orelectronic survey tomeasure results of a specific point or area ofoperational, tactical, or strategicsignificance that has beensubjected to a strike. Effects measured by an SFODmay be of amilitary or nonmilitary nature, addressing material,informational,economic, psychological, or cultural impacts of thestrike. A poststrike recon-naissance by SFODs may be a short-termsurvey to determine immediate andcollateral material damage.
Information RequirementsIf the reconnaissance is of a strike byfriendly forces, SFOD preparation for post-strike reconnaissancebegins with the question “What was the type and extent ofthe damageintended, as stated by the commander ordering the strike?” If there-connaissance is of a strike by threat forces, the starting pointis the assumed in-tent of the threat commander. The SFOD organizesits efforts to gather indicatorsand other information that will aidthe senior intelligence officer (SIO) in theFOB in answering thefollowing SIR:
What was the weapon used?What did the strike actually hit(stated in terms of actual point[s] of impact,immediate damage, andcollateral damage)?Was the intended type and extent of damage oreffect achieved?To what degree was effect achieved (stated asintended point or points ofimpact, distance and azimuth from theintended point[s] of impact, and apercentage of damage)?
3-10
FM 31-20-5
What part of the target was hit or missed?Was the prestriketarget analysis accurate and adequate? If not, what were
the deficiencies?What is the target activity as a result of thestrike?Are forces on or near the target employing any special orunique recovery
equipment, techniques, or procedures?
Employment of SFODsSFODs should be committed to poststrikereconnaissance only where the data tobe collected is of the utmoststrategic importance and cannot be collected byother means, forexample, aerial reconnaissance, satellite, unmanned aerial ve-hicle(UAV), developed human sources. SFODs should not be sent to confirmifevery mission hit the target because the indiscriminateemployment of SFODsmay establish a pattern, alerting threat forces,increasing risk of detection andcompromise, and degrading theprobability of mission success. Threat forcesquickly become awareof a pattern of sending in reconnaissance teams on post-strikeassessments and actively seek to interdict and destroy them.
Techniques and ProceduresDuring the poststrike mission certainlocations must be determined. To collectthe needed information onthese locations, SFODs use a variety of standard andnonstandardtechniques and procedures in poststrike reconnaissance.
Receonnaisance and Surveillance. To collect the neededinformation, SFODs nor-mally conduct patrolling and/or set upobservation and surveillance sites. Theemphasis is on offsetmethods in most cases as opposed to actually entering ortraversingthe target.
The intended point of impact (POI) is that specific point on theground where theordnance was to impact. The SFOD may be given onlya general idea of its loca-tion in relation to its target. In mostcases, the POI will be identifiable as a crateror a scorchedarea.
Damage in the area of effect (AOE) maybe classified as immediateor collateral.Immediate damage is that damage directly inflicted bythe ordnance at the mo-ment of its impact and/or detonation.Collateral damage is the secondary effectsof the ordnance. Fires,structural weakening and/or collapse, abandonment or re-inforcementof the target are all secondary effects. Taken together, the areasofimmediate and collateral damage constitute the AOE.
When planning a poststrike mission, the SFOD must consider theminimum safedistance (MSD) and what will happen if the target hasnot sustained the desiredeffect? Will another mission be fired orflown? If so, what will be fired ordropped? This information willbe important when planning the safe distancesrequired for theplacement of the observation and surveillance sites, missionsup-port sites, or other fixed locations. Planning should alsoinclude establishing anexclusionary zone from which all patrolsmust depart before ordnance is deliv-ered. This procedure aidscommanders in ensuring that friendly fire casualties areavoided.Safe distances can be calculated by using Figure 3-7, page 3-12.Anexample of a poststrike overlay depicting the POI, AOE, and MSDis shown inFigure 3-8, page 3-12. Other specific ordnance safetyconsiderations used whenmoving around an area where different typesof munitions have been used areaddressed in Appendix I.
3-11
FM 31-20-5
3-12
FM 31-20-5
TARGET ANALYSIS
Records. Complete records must be maintained during the conductof the post-strike mission. These records should include maps,sketches, photographs,notes, and other records of the SFOD’sobservations. Record keeping is dis-cussed in Appendix C.
TA is the assessment of a specific, technically complex targetin the context ofPIR, IR, and/or SIR grouped into the categories ofcriticality, accessibility, recu-perability, vulnerability, effect,and recognizability. An SFOD may, for example,conduct a TA of anindustrial establishment or other technicallysophisticatedcomplexes for follow-on DA or UW attack. The same sortof analysis can allowan HN government to defend such a complex in aFID environment. TheCARVER target analysis matrix and thefeasibility assessments are the founda-tion of the TA process. TheFA is an evaluation of the risks of a mission, and itanswersquestions of whether the attacking force can complete the missionandsurvive. TA is a cooperative effort between the SFOD performingthe SR missionand the intelligence functions at battalion andcompany level. This analysis seeksto answer PIR/IR and SIR in theCARVER target analysis matrix categories. Tar-get analysis is theresponsibility of the battalion S2, but the SFOD can often beusedto answer SIR that can be satisfied by no other means. Preparationfor TArequires review and understanding of the steps in the processdescribed below.
TA StepsTA can be overt or clandestine. It can be conducted aspart of a larger AA, or itcan be a distinct mission activity. Itcan take place during peacetime competition,conflict, or war. It isoften more than a traditional reconnaissance and less thanafull-scale analysis. It comprises the cyclic steps outlinedbelow.
Step One. The first step is a joint S2 and SFOD review of thecommander’s guid-ance and stated requirements, which set out whatis to be accomplished regardingthe target. In a FID environment,this step includes an evaluation of the threat tothe target.
Step Two. The second step is the gathering, organizing, andevaluating of allavailable information about the target and theidentification of gaps in the data,The S2 provides maps,photographs, flow charts, blueprints, diagrams, and otherdata forreview. With the help of the S2, the employed SFOD examines thein-formation to answer as much of the mission PIR and/or IR beforeinfiltration.The S2 begins preparing a CARVER report and “targetfolder” that highlights thegaps in available information at thisstep and uses them to develop a detailedcollection plan.
Step Three. After infiltration, the SFOD surveys the target. Ina nonpermissive en-vironment, the SFOD ordinarily tries topenetrate the target area and set up fixedsites to survey thetarget and/or run small patrols into the target (particularly if itisa complex spread over a wide area). The SFOD gathers informationthat—
Validates data gathered and conclusions drawn up to thisstep.Satisfies PIR and IR.Gives the supported targeting analystand/or the SFOD a “feel” for the target.
3-13
FM 31-20-5
If the survey is overt and with the cooperation of personnelworking at the site,the SFOD follows the rules in the target surveychecklist shown in Figure 3-9.
Step Four. The fourth step is the completion of the CARVERreconnaissance re-port and its transmittal to the battalion S2.Figure 3-10 is a checklist showing theminimum recommended datarequirements for a CARVER reconnaissance reportprepared by anSFOD.
3-14
FM 31-20-5
CARVER MatrixThe SFOD can reproduce the results of its TAgraphically in a matrix throughwhich target variables are reducedto numbers (Figure 3-11, page 3-16). This ma-trix is a tool forrating the relative desirability of potential targets and forallocat-ing resources for subsequent DA. Normally, the SFOD,company, and battalionintelligence NCOs jointly prepare the CARVERmatrix. A 10-point scale is usedto measure each of the CARVERvariables.
Criticality. A target is critical when its damage or destructionwill have a signifi-cant influence on military, political, oreconomic operations. SFODs considereach target in relation to otherelements of the particular target system or targetcomplex nominatedor designated for attack. The criticality of the target changeswiththe situation. For example, when one has few locomotives, railroadbridgesmay be less critical as targets; however, safeguardingbridges may be critical tomaneuvering GP forces who use suchbridges. The standard of assigning crit-icality values on CARVERmatrixes is shown in Figure 3-12, page 3-16. Criti-cality dependson several factors:
Time: How rapidly will the impact of the target attack affectoperations?Qualify: What percentage of output, production, orservice will be curtailedby target damage?Surrogates: What will bethe effect on the output, production, and service?Relativity: Howmany targets are there, what are their positions, how istheirrelative value determined, and what will be affected in thesystem or complex?
3-15
FM 31-20-5
3-16
FM 31-20-5
Accessibility. A target is accessible when an operationalelement (includingknowledgeable insiders) can infiltrate the targetwith sufficient personnel andequipment to accomplish its mission,Assessing accessibility entails identifyingand studying criticalpath(s) that the operational element must take to achieveitsobjective(s) and measuring those things that aid or impedeaccess. The standardfor assigning accessibility values on CARVERmatrixes is shown in Figure 3-13.Accessibility may be broken downinto three parts:
Infiltration from the staging base to the target area.Movementfrom the LZ, DZ, BLS, or other entry points to the proximity ofthetarget.Movement into the target and onto the criticalelement(s).
In most cases, assessing the critical path(s) an SFOD performinga DA missionmust take to exfiltrate the target area is desirable.Factors to consider whenevaluating accessibility include man-madeand other barriers and obstacles, ac-tive and passive early warningsystems, swimmer detection devices, air defensecapabilities in thetarget area, road and rail transportation assets, land use,coverand concealment, and population density. The analysis alongeach critical path tothe target should measure the time it wouldtake for the SFOD to bypass, neutral-ize, or penetrate barriers andobstacles along the way. Accessibility is measuredin terms ofrelative ease or difficulty of movement for the SFOD and thelikeli-hood of detection. Analysts should always consider the useof standoff weaponssuch as mortars or antitank type weapons in suchevaluations.
Recuperability. A target’s recuperability is measured in time,that is, the time itwill take to replace, repair, or bypassdestruction of or damage to a target. Recu-perability varies withthe sources and type of targeted components in the targetcomplex.Recuperability should factor in such items as stockpiles, backupsys-tems, repair facilities, and spare parts. The standard forassigning recuperabilityvalues on CARVER matrixes is shown inFigure 3-14, page 3-18.
3-17
FM 31-20-5Vulnerability. A target is vulnerable if the SFOD hasthe means and expertise tosuccessfully attack the target. Whendetermining the vulnerability of a target, theSFOD A compares thecritical component with the capability of the attackingelement todestroy or damage it. In general, the attacking element may tendtochoose special components, do permanent damage, prevent orinhibit cannibal-ization, maximize effects through use of on-sitematerials, and/or cause the targetto self-destruct. Vulnerabilitydepends on the nature and construction of the tar-get, amount ofdamage required, and the assets available. Examples includeper-sonnel, expertise, motivation, weapons, explosives, andequipment. The standardfor assigning vulnerability values on CARVERmatrixes is shown in Figure 3-15.
3-18
FM 31-20-5
Effect. The effect of a target attack is a measure of possiblemilitary, political,economic, psychological, and sociologicalimpacts at the target and beyond.Closely related to the measure oftarget criticality is the type and magnitude ofgiven effectsdesired that will help planners select targets and targetcomponentsfor attack. Effect in this sense, however, addresses allsignificant effects, whetherdesired or not, that will likely resultonce the selected target component isattacked. Traditionally, thiselement has addressed the effect on the local popu-lace, but nowbroader considerations are addressed as well. For example, thepri-mary effect of the destruction of two adjacent long-range radarsites in an earlywarning system may be to open in the system a holeof sufficient size to causeenough down time to permit the attackerto launch a successful airmobile ormissile strike against thedefender. Effects can also include the triggeringofcountermeasures, support or negation of PSYOP themes,unemployment,reprisals against the civilian populace, collateraldamage to other targets, and thelike effects. Possible effects canbe speculative (and should be labelled as such),and effects of thesame attack maybe quite different at the tactical and theopera-tional and/or strategic levels. An example of speculativeeffects is the destructionof a substation that does not affectlocal power supply but cuts off all power to anadjacent region. Thestandard for assigning effect values on CARVER matrixesis shown inFigure 3-16, page 3-20.
Recognizability. A target’s recognizability is the degree towhich it can be recog-nized by an operational element and/orintelligence collection and reconnais-sance assets under varyingconditions of distance, weather, light, and seasonwithout confusionwith other targets or components. Factors that influencerec-ognizability include the size and complexity of the target, theexistence of dis-tinctive target signatures, the presence ofmasking or camouflage, and thetechnical sophistication and trainingof the attackers. The standard for assigningrecognizability valueson CARVER matrixes is shown in Figure 3-17, page 3-20.
NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL RECONNAISSANCE
NBC reconnaissance can be in a wide range of forms. For example,overflightscan be used to look for dead vegetation and wildlife.However, if a possible NBCarea is encountered, commanders will havemany questions such as—
When and where did the NBC strike occur?Will the threat continueusing NBC weapons?Were the weapons effective?
Given the effectiveness of modern weapons, questions concerningNBC use willhave a high priority on the PIR and IR lists. One ofthe first questions should bewhether or not anything happened atall. For example, industrial accidents or at-tacks on industrialfacilities often produce effects similar to NBC strikes. If, ontheother hand, NBC use can be confirmed, the battlefield commander isthenpermitted to request a response in kind. The theater commanderwould task theSF group through the SOC to obtain samples andinformation that confirm ordeny NBC use. SFODs supported by groupchemical assets, such as the LB team,can perform this type ofmission.
3-19
FM 31-20-5The primary problem with using SF soldiers to conductNBC reconnaissance isthat extensive training and equipment arerequired. Such NBC training andequipment are not normally affordedto SFODs. This void was identified andfilled by LB teams, who havebeen assigned to SF groups. The LB team has thespecial skills andequipment to conduct this hazardous mission when augmentedto SFODs.For a further explanation of the role of SF and non-SF unitsduringchemical operations, refer to Appendix E and FM 3-18.
3-20
FM 31-20-5
SPECIFIC INFORMATION AND OTHER COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS
Specific data collection (SDC) is the most common taskassociated with SR. TheSFOD conducts SDC mission to collect aspecified piece or type of information.Normally, an SFOD conductsSDC as the collateral requirements of SR, that is,the requirementto infiltrate, to operate, and to exfiltrate undetected. Themostcommon types of SDC include but are not limited to LOCsurveillances, pointtarget surveillance, information collection,and signal intercept.
LOC SurveillanceIn this type of operation, the SFOD infiltratesa JSOA and establishes surveil-lance along the specified LOC. TheLOC could be a major highway, a rail line, oreven a canal, alongwhich significant traffic passes or is expected to pass. TheSFODthen collects and reports information concerning activity along theLOCbased upon predetermined or specified significant indicators.These indicatorsare normally pieces of equipment, types of units,or even certain types of activi-ties. The indicators may themselvesbe innocuous, but their presence or absencealong the LOC mayprovide significant operational or strategic intelligence.Ex-amples of significant indicators are NBC delivery means,chemical decontamina-tion equipment, air defense artillery (ADA)system radars, special purposetroops, large or unusual troop orequipment convoys, refugee movements, spe-cialized unit equipment,security force activities, or heavy construction activities.
LOC surveillance units provide the CINC or JTF commander “eyeson”HUMINT of threat operational or strategic intent. SFODs receivethis taskingbecause it is beyond the capability of other means orbecause the tasking au-thority needs the flexibility that humanoperators provide.
The success of SFODs conducting this type of surveillance oftendepends on theirability to avoid compromise. Operational securityrequirements drive many of theconsiderations that determineinfiltration and/or exfiltration means as well as thesurveillanceand observation technique and equipment selected to perform themis-sion. Almost exclusively, these missions will require staticobservation techniques.Movement equates to compromise! The SFODmust consider METT-T when se-lecting LOC observation sites. Siteselection drives the SFOD’s ability to placeconstant observation onthe LOC. Use of visual observation aids (binoculars,scopes,cameras) and thermal or infrared devices increase the SFOD’sstand-offdistance and lessens the risk of compromise. Poor weatheror heavy vegetationmay require the SFOD to use multiple sites toachieve constant observation.
Specific Target SurveillanceSpecific target surveillance is muchlike LOC surveillance. For example, anSFOD assigned this missioninfiltrates and observes a specific target, location, oractivitysuch as threat strength or activity at a suspected supply base,prisoner-of-war (PW) compound, air base, or missile launch site.Unlike LOC surveillance,the SFOD does not have the same options inselecting its observation site(s).Vantage points may be limited orrestricted in terms of how they maybe used toaccomplish themission. SFODs consider all METT-T factors when selectingproposedsites.
SFODs conduct specific target surveillance missions to collect,confirm, or refuteintelligence about a target(s). This information,once processed, is used to plan
3-21
FM 31-20-5
interdiction missions or to suppcrt DA missions against thetarget(s) in question.The SFOD tasked with the surveillance missiondoes not routinely “rollover” andconduct the DA against the target.That mission normally will be tasked to an-other SFOD that willspecifically plan DA against the target using the informa-tionprovided by the SR element.
JR for these missions are normally worded very precisely. Ifvaguely presented,the SFOD ensures clarification early in themission planning cycle. Often, the IRor their associated reportingrequirements determine observation site selection orthesurveillance technique selected to effect the mission. For example,a largecompound can require the use of multiple sites to ensuresufficient coverage.These large targets present command and controlproblems and heighten the riskof compromise. Multiple sites posespecial problems for the SFOD communica-tions capabilities,especially in the numbers and types of radios required. Multi-plesurveillance sites also require the SFOD to determine itsinternalcommunications needs whether the element acts independentlyor in coordina-tion with other elements. The SFOD always balancessecurity considerationsagainst execution techniques.
A key to mission success during SR is the ability to infiltratethe target area, gainall available information, then exfiltratewhile the threat remains unaware of theSFOD’s presence.
Information CollectionThis term generically addresses those SRmissions to obtain information previouslyunknown or to refute orconfirm specific information about a target that does notneatlyfall under the category of surveillance. Examples of this type ofSR includeNBC agent confirmation; soil, water, or air survey and/orsampling; mute reconnais-sance DZ and/or LZ surveys; or any otherspecific data requirements. Such a mis-sion is almost alwayslimited to the spccific data or indicators required.
Often, these missions require the SFOD to conductmission-specific skill trainingor to accept augmentation by non-SFsubject matter experts. Augmentation mayentail an LB team,topographic or civil engineers, explosive ordnance disposal(EOD)soldiers, or scientific specialists such as toxicologists ormeteorologists.When augmenters conduct a mission, specialpremission training is required forboth the SFOD and theaugmenters. Regardless of the rank of the augmentee, theSFOD isresponsible for safe infiltration, security, and exfiltration aswell asreaction to contingencies. Specialists focus on theirspecialty, while the SFODsupports them.
Once the SFOD collects the information, it forwards thatinformation to the FOB.The SFOD must know when there is enoughinformation to warrant a report.
Signal InterceptAn SFOD tasked to conduct signal interceptoperations requires extensive lan-guage and equipment training. Forthis reason, a SOT A, found in the battalionmilitary intelligencedetachments (MIDs), is attached to an SFOD to conduct sig-nalintercept operations. Signal intercept missions, both voice andcode, areclosely controlled by the theater intelligence center. TheSOT A collects informa-tion that may have tactical, operational, orstrategic value. This information al-most always passes from theSOT A and terminates at the SFOB’s or FOB’ssensitive compartmentedinformation facility (SCIF).
3-22
FM 31-20-5
When a SOT A performs this type of SR in a nonperrnissiveenvironment, it nor-really is attached to an SFOD. Thisaugmentation occurs because the MOS train-ing of the SOT A coversonly general soldier skills and its signal collectiontraining. TheSFOD conducts joint mission planning and premission trainingtoensure all participants understand their responsibilities. FM34-36 provides a de-finitive explanation of SOT A and SOFintelligence and electronic warfare(IEW) operations.
INCIDENTAL INFORMATION COLLECTION
Incidental information collection is not a separate mission. Itis, as the name im-plies, conducted “incidentally” to anothermission. Incidental information collec-tion, which is passive andovert, does not provide a reason for active informationcollection.Missions cannot be planned to obtain incidental information.
Incidental information collection is not conducted in responseto taskings orrequirements. Taskings and requirements imply thatSFODs are authorized toactively collect data and that they areexpected to fulfill those requirements. Inci-dental informationcollection objectives imply no such charter, and the SFOD isnotheld responsible for meeting them. Obtaining the data specified inincidentalinformation collection objectives is merely an additionalbenefit of other activi-ties. To specify incidental informationcollection objectives, the SIO reviews hisexisting data bases formissing or incomplete information. Additionally, he main-tainsactive coordination with other elements that may have identifiedintelli-gence deficiencies. He should maintain these intelligenceshortfalls as a standinglist of IR. The SIO reviews this list whenpreparing a mission brief for an SFOD.Those items that do notdirectly relate to the tasked mission but with which theSFOD mayreasonably be expected to observe become incidentalinformationcollection objectives.
After the SFOD receives the mission briefing, it reviews theincidental informa-tion collection objectives. After the SFOD Acompletes the POE, the intelligencesergeant analyzes it to identifylikely times when locations or activities listed inthe objectivesmay be observed. No alteration of the plan is made toincreaselikelihood of observing the desired data. Where theobjective data itself may notbe directly observable, theintelligence sergeant develops a list of indicators forSFODmembers. All members are “sensitized” (made aware of) to theobjectivesand indicators.
The prefemed means of reporting incidental informationcollection objectives isby including the data in routine encryptedreports at the earliest possible time.The SFOD must be sensitive tothe fact that any appearance of active espionagemay damage theprimary mission or even jeopardize relations with the host na-tion.Therefore, the SFOD should limit and carefully safeguard writtenrecords.Each returning SFOD should include any incidentalinformation in their areaassessment or after action review within24 to 48 hours after being debriefed.
For clarity, the following is an example of an SFOD involved inincidental in-formation collection while acting as a mobiletraining team (MIT) tasked to con-duct training in nation X at the33d Battalion. The SFOD provides small unitpatrolling training to aselect border reconnaissance company. One of the SFOD’sincidentalinformation collection objectives is to note indicators of externalsupport
3-23
FM 31-20-5
to dissidents in the 33d Battalion’s area of responsibility.Such indicators may in-clude the presence of foreign weapons andmunitions, propaganda products be-yond local reproductioncapability, or the presence of foreign personnel inunlikelylocations or numbers.
During the training, a squad leader in the border reconnaissancecompany pro-duces a specific type of antitank weapon of recentmanufacture that is foreign tothe HN and United States. Heindicates that it was recovered during a recent raidon a suspecteddissident safehouse. As part of the training, he is interestedinknowing the purpose of the weapon and safe handling proceduresfor this andsimilar artifacts captured in the future.
Since the SFOD clearly identified the weapon as coming from anexternal sourceand allegedly being in the possession of knowndissidents, the SFOD would re-port the data through the battalionSIO to the interested agency. The data wasobtained in the course ofroutine activity and was not the result of active collec-tionattempts. Similarly, the SFOD, while eating in a local restaurant,may seehigh-quality anti-U.S. propaganda posters echoing certainthemes. This informa-tion may be an important indicator obtained inthe course of normal activities.
3-24
FM 31-20-5
CHAPTER
PREMISSIONACTIVITIESDevelopment of a special operations missionplanning folder (SOMPF) andsupporting POE is the goal of premissiontraining. The nature of SR requiresa higher degree of missionanalysis, plannning, and mission specitic trainningthan thatassociated with combat patrolling. This chapter is broken downintofour sections. The first section describes mission analysis andcommand andstaff responsibilities upon receipt of a mission taskingin a garrison posture.The second section describes the missionanalysis and home station planningin support of a specificoperation plan (OPLAN). The third section describesspecific SRmission preparation and training done before becoming opera-tional.The last section discusses the final prepartion for plannedmissionsand adaptive planning for emerging missions in anoperational configuration.
SECTION I. MISSION ANALYSISMission analysis views all sources ofmission taskings and sets priorities for re-sources and effortsthrough a clear statement of the battalion commander’s intentandconcept of operations. It provides the basis for the battalionpreparation ofmission letters to the SFOD A and support platoonand/or detachment level.
PROCEDURES
Home station mission analysis follows the procedures outlined inFM 101-5. Thespecific application of this decision-making processto SR is described below. Thisprocess assumes the SF battalion hasmore than one OPLAN it may be required toexecute. It is designed toallocate resources and set priorities of effort. DraftMETLs aredeveloped and refined based on specific mission planning. The bulkofthe work on area studies is completed prior to beginning specificmission planning.Sources, processes, and products are summarized inFigure 2-1 (page 2-2).
An SF battalion is seldom activated from scratch; therefore,planning does notbegin with a total absence of previous guidance orplanning. The process is nor-mally modified and enhanced by priorwork done by the battalion. Complete re-views of the naturedescribed above should be done—
As soon as a new mission letter is received.When supportedOPLANs are significantly changed.When the situation in the area ofresponsibility (AOR) changes dramatically(as in Europe in therecent past) or as the commander prescribes (normallyonce every 18months to 2 years).
2-1
FM 31-20-5
Step 1 - Mission Receipt
The mission analysis process at battalion level and below beginswith receipt ofthe mission letter from the SF group (refer to FM31-20, Appendix F). This levelis the lowest level at which amission letter will identify the requirement to con-duct SR. Thebattalion staffs must analyze the mission letter in conjunctionwitha number of other documents. Among them are specific OPLANs thebattalion istasked to support. Peacetime campaign plans (PCPs)outline major operationssuch as the overall counterdrug efforts foran area or region. Joint strategic capa-bilities plans (JSCPs) arethe plans used to allocate appropriate resources andmanpower. ThePCPs and JSCPs developed at the JCS and unified command lev-els arebasic outlines of the “big picture” for regional U.S. efforts. Thebattalionmust also review other documents, such as developed warplans (OPLANs and/or concept plans [CONPLANs]) containing orimplying mission requirements. Inaddition to extend documentsspecifying potential missions, the battalion com-mander may deducemissions based on his evaluation of the assigned AOR. Thebattalioncommander must direct priority of effort first to externallydirectedmissions and second to deduced missions. The battalionstaff should forward de-duced mission requirements to the SF groupfor validation and inclusion in task-ing documents. SFOD Acommanders must have a clear understanding of theintent of all thecommanders involved whether or not the mission is externallyorinternally developed. If any staff member notes a conflict orlacks overall under-standing of the intent, he should resolve theseproblems at the highest level be-fore mission analysisproceeds.
2-2
FM 31-20-5
Step 2 - Information ExchangeDuring this step, staffrepresentatives and commanders exchange informationcritical toinitial mission analysis. The battalion staff is the focal pointfor passinginformation. Therefore, it must ensure that all requestsand responses are quicklyand fully disseminated.
Step 3 - Initial Mission AnalysisUsing BOS, the commander,selected staff representatives, and certain key sup-port elementleaders review the documents received in step 1 and list thespeci-fied and implied tasks. They must consider the relat
![TABLE OF CONTENTS - Internet Archive...Doctrine for Special Forces Operations, 20 April 1990. FM 31-26. (SECRET/NOFORN/WNINTEL) Special Forces Advanced Opera-tions Techniques (U) (To - [PDF Document] (2024)]()